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Abstract
The Tokyo Electric Power’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in 2011 was 
a turning point for Japan’s nuclear energy and overall energy policy. In reality, 
Japan has reduced its dependence on nuclear energy drastically despite the govern-
ment’s policy to maintain nuclear energy as a major power source. Even with sharp 
drop in production from nuclear energy, Japan could achieve carbon reduction of 
around 60–70% by 2050 even without nuclear power. But the biggest impact of the 
Fukushima accident is the loss of public trust. The policy debate on nuclear energy 
is now divided between “pro” and “anti” of nuclear power. The aim of this study 
is to analyze why such “polarized debate” has not been resolved and find a way 
to restore public trust. This study analyzes three important nuclear energy policy 
issues, i.e., decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, spent nuclear 
fuel and waste management, and plutonium stockpile management. The analysis of 
these three cases suggest that lack of independent oversight organizations is a com-
mon cause of impasse of nuclear energy policy debate. The author argues that Japan 
needs to establish independent oversight organizations in order to gain public trust 
and solve important policy issues regardless of the future of nuclear energy.
Keywords: Fukushima accident, polarized debate, public trust,  
independent oversight, nuclear waste, plutonium
1. Introduction
The Tokyo Electric Power Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident was a turning 
point for Japan’s nuclear energy and overall energy policy.
The biggest impact is the huge drop in the number of reactors operating and 
its share in electricity supply in Japan. Before the Fukushima accident in 2010, the 
share of nuclear energy was about 25%, and it went down to zero in 2012 and still 
only 1.7% in 2016 [1]. It is surprising that despite such sharp reduction in nuclear 
power generation, no serious power shortage has happened in Japan. One of the 
main reasons is sharp reduction in electricity consumption and peak demand. In 
FY 2011, power consumption dropped about 3.8% from FY 2010, and consumption 
continued to decline until FY 2016 and is now about 10% below the level of FY 
2010. Peak demand also declined sharply. Its peak demand in FY 2010 was 178 GWe 
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in August 23, 2010 but declined to 153 GW in FY 2015 on August 7, 2015, which is 
about 14% reduction [1].
Another major impact of the Fukushima accident is loss of public trust and 
dramatic shift in public opinion on nuclear power. Before the Fukushima accident, 
majority of the public was in favor of either maintaining or expansion of nuclear 
power, but now majority of the public was in favor of either immediate shutdown 
of all reactors or gradual phaseout of nuclear power. Based on such shift in public 
opinion, the government under the Democratic Party of Japan in 2012 issued a new 
energy policy to phase out nuclear power by the end of 2030 [2]. But the new gov-
ernment under the Liberal Democratic Party reversed its policy and still maintains 
nuclear power as an important power source [3]. But loss of public trust has not 
been restored, and majority of the public still believes that severe nuclear accident 
could happen despite the new and much tougher nuclear safety regulation stan-
dards and establishment by the newly established, independent Nuclear Regulation 
Authority (NRA) in 2013.
As a result, whenever a reactor is ready for restart up, public debate occurs and 
legal cases follow although the pronuclear government and utility industry insist 
that restart-up of nuclear power is necessary for economy and energy security. In 
short, the country is now divided into “pro” and “anti” nuclear energy, and policy 
debate is often polarized and has led to unproductive discussion, and major policy 
issues remain unsolved. It is important to clarify the issues that need to be addressed 
regardless of the future of nuclear energy. By focusing on these issues and through 
more productive policy discussion, consensus may emerge among the public on 
what to do to solve those important issues.
Meanwhile, new energy policy of Japan should reflect new developments in 
renewable energy and energy efficiency in which the public has strong support. 
Given structural change in energy demand and rapid development of renewable 
energy, Japan could reduce its carbon emission by 60–70% by 2050, based on the 
recent analysis [4, 5].
The aim of this study is to analyze why “polarized debate” has not been resolved 
and find a way to restore public trust by focusing on issues that need to be resolved 
regardless of the future of nuclear energy.
2. Loss of public trust
The loss of public trust is one of the biggest impacts of the Fukushima nuclear 
accident. Public opinion on nuclear power in Japan has changed dramatically since 
the Fukushima accident.
According to the public polling done by Japan Atomic Energy Relations 
Organization [6], the ratio of public who believe that nuclear power is necessary 
was 35.4% in 2010 but dropped to 23.5% in 2011 after the accident and further 
dropped to 17.9% in 2017. At the same time, the ratio of the public who do not trust 
nuclear power (community) jumped from 10.2% in 2010 to 24.3% in 2011 and now 
even increased to 30.2% in 2017.
The public has lost faith in nuclear safety regulation too. Faith has not been 
fully restored even after a new independent Nuclear Regulation Authority was 
established in 2012, and new, much tougher regulatory standards were introduced. 
According to the same JAERO study, the ratio of the public who trust the govern-
ment and nuclear industry is 1.9 and 1.2%, respectively, and the ratio of the public 
who do not trust the government and nuclear industry is 20.5 and 22.0%, respec-
tively. The reasons for “not trustworthy” cited by those are lack of information 
disclosure (nuclear industry 68.3%, government 62.5%), insufficient preparation 
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and management on safety (nuclear industry 60.4%, government 54.1%), and 
not speaking honestly (nuclear industry 59.8%, government 59.2%). As a result, 
the ratio of the public who think that nuclear power should be increased and/or 
maintained before the Fukushima accident continuously dropped to 10.1% in 2014 
and only 6.9% in 2017. On the other hand, the ratio of the public who are in favor of 
phasing out and/or should be abolished now increased to 79.6% in 2017 from 56.2% 
in 2013.
In the latest polling undertaken by Mainichi Shimbun in March 2018 [7], the 
proportion of the public who oppose the restarting of existing reactors rose to 55%, 
an increase of 2% points from previous polling on this question. And the proportion 
of the public who support the restarting of existing reactors was down to 26%, a 
decline of 4% from the previous polling. As a result, its gap between the opposition 
and the support became bigger.
The previous government under the Democratic Party of Japan tried to restore 
public trust by introducing more open decision-making process. Prime Minister 
Naoto Kan announced that it would critically review nuclear energy policy “from 
scratch” and set up new policy-making process to encourage “national public 
debate” on nuclear energy. It set up a new cabinet-level Council on Energy and 
Environment and promoted public participation in policy-making process. As 
a result, a new “Innovative Energy and Environmental Strategy” was issued in 
September 2012, incorporating results of public opinion polls which showed that 
majority of the public was in favor of “phasing out nuclear power.” The new strategy 
aimed at phasing out nuclear power by the end of the 2030s and did not allow for 
new construction of nuclear power plants [2].
But newly elected Shinzo Abe’s government abolished the previous govern-
ment’s “nuclear phaseout” policy and abolished the open policy-making process 
to reflect public opinions to the decision-making. On April 11, 2014, the new 
Strategic Energy Plan was adopted by the cabinet [3]. Although the new plan 
stated that Japan will reduce its dependence on nuclear energy as much as pos-
sible, it still maintains that nuclear power is an important “base-load power 
source” (i.e., essential power source which should be operated 24 hours/day 
without changing its output). As a result, its “dual policy goals” (the goal of 
“decreasing dependence on nuclear power as much as possible” and the goal of 
“using nuclear power as a base-load power source”) send confusing signals to the 
public and energy market. Later the METI published its future energy mix projec-
tion, suggesting that nuclear power’s share in 2030 should be around 20–22% [8]. 
In order to achieve that goal, not only existing reactors should be restarted, but 
Japan may need new reactors replacing old reactors. Since then, the debate over 
nuclear energy—especially the restart of existing reactors—has been polarized as 
the government pushed its pronuclear stance, while the public was still in favor of 
eventual phaseout of nuclear energy.
On July 3, 2018, the Japanese government adopted METI’s new “Strategic Energy 
Plan” as a cabinet decision [9]. The new Strategic Energy Plan has some new fea-
tures compared with the previous 2014 plan, such as stronger emphasis on renew-
able energy and new statement on plutonium stockpile which will be discussed later 
in this paper. But in overall, the plan is not so different from the previous plan. The 
plan still defines nuclear power as an important base-load power, while it aims to 
reduce its dependency on nuclear power as much as possible as was the case in the 
previous strategic plan in 2014.
Although the majority of the public seems to be in favor of phasing out nuclear 
energy, the Japanese government continues to maintain its commitment to nuclear 
power. As of October 26, 2018, only 9 out of 39 existing reactors are operating, 
while 6 received operating licenses but have not yet started operation, and 16 
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reactors have been closed (to be decommissioned) since the accident. But still 
there are 14 reactors that have not applied for re-license, while 3 reactors are under 
construction [10]. It is not certain when and whether those reactors will receive 
operating licenses in the near future.
Political process to restart the nuclear reactors is complex and not straightfor-
ward in Japan. Technically, getting the approval from the NRA is sufficient to start 
up the reactor, but not politically sufficient. Utilities must get local governments’ 
approval under the so-called Safety Agreement, which is a gentlemen agreement 
(not legally binding) between local governments and utilities. In particular, evacu-
ation issue is the major hurdle for restart up, as evacuation plan is not a subject of 
NRA licensing process, and thus it is not clear how and who determines the appro-
priateness of evacuation plans.
Another challenge is legal lawsuits against utilities and/or government on 
nuclear safety. After the Fukushima accident, it is no longer automatic to assume 
that local residents and nuclear opponents lose the case. Uncertainties about 
legal decisions on nuclear safety issues are increasing due to different interpreta-
tion of “safety” by the courts. For example, on December 13, 2017, the high court 
in Hiroshima granted the injunction requested by the residents in Hiroshima 
and opponents for the operating Ikata #3 and #4 reactors. This was the first 
time that the high court granted the injunction against operating reactors [11]. 
However, on September 25, 2018, the same high court in Hiroshima now granted 
the objections from Shikoku Denryoku who is the operator of Ikata reactors and 
allowed the utility to restart the reactor. It turned out the judges who made the 
decision to grant the utilities are different from those who made decision to grant 
the injunction in 2017 [12].
3.  Impact on energy policy of the Fukushima accident and long-term 
prospects on carbon emissions
As noted above, Japan’s energy supply and demand picture has dramatically 
changed after the Fukushima nuclear accident. The sudden reduction of power 
production from nuclear power forced Japan to increase in fossil fuel consump-
tion which led to increase in electricity rates, from 20 yen/kWh (the average of 
consumer electricity rate) in 2010 to more than 25 yen/kWh in 2014. But then, 
due to decrease in fossil fuel prices, it went down to about 20 yen/kWh in 2015 [1]. 
Increased consumption of fossil fuel resulted in increase of CO2 emission of Japan, 
peaking its emission at 1.4 billion tons in 2013, but then declined to 1.3 billion tons 
in 2015 and 2016. The reasons for decline of CO2 emission are increasing produc-
tion of renewable energy and increased energy efficiency which led to reduction of 
energy consumption itself [13].
The energy efficiency improvement rate was almost equal to the one achieved 
after the first oil crisis in 1973. The average improvement rate of energy effi-
ciency was 2.9% per from FY 1973 to 1985, while it was 3.2% per year from FY 
2011 to 2014 [4].
According to a study done by a team at Japan Center for Economic Research 
(JCER) [4, 5], such trends will likely to continue based on the assumption that fossil 
fuel price will continue to increase and Japan’s energy and economic structure will 
shift to more energy efficient nonmanufacturing industries. Furthermore, the study 
assumes expansion of renewable energy up to 60% of total electricity production 
through interviews of experts of renewable energy in Japan. The study also assumes 
that 15% of electricity production will come from nuclear power from 2030, which 
may require construction of new reactors to replace old reactors in Japan.
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Based on such assumptions, Japan could reduce CO2 emissions by 60% by 2030 
or even 70% with introduction of environmental tax. Nuclear power, if it is too 
expensive, could be replaced by carbon capture storage (CCS) fossil power plants 
which are assumed to be commercially competitive by 2030. In fact, the study 
also analyzes the impact of the Fukushima accident on the economics of nuclear 
power. Due to increase in accident associate costs, nuclear power’s commercial 
competitive advantage may disappear, and thus total cost of carbon reduction 
strategy without nuclear may not be so expensive compared with the one with 
nuclear power [4].
The study results suggest that Japan’s carbon reduction strategy may not need 
nuclear power as was expected before. In short, the most important factor in carbon 
reduction strategy is likely to be energy efficiency improvement and expansion of 
renewable energy, and thus dependence on nuclear power can be reduced as much 
as possible. In fact, public trust is essential in solving key policy issues regardless of 
the future of nuclear energy.
4.  Analysis of three issues which need to be resolved regardless of the 
future of nuclear energy
Primarily due to loss of public trust, polarized debate has not led to constructive 
policy debate to solve important policy issues that need to be addressed regardless 
of the future of nuclear power. What would be necessary to avoid polarized debate 
and constructive discussion which could lead to solutions to important policy 
issues? This section deals with three important policy issues and examines the ways 
to overcome the current difficulties of polarized debate.
4.1 The decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi reactors
More than 7 years have passed since the earthquake, but the accident is not 
completely over. About 60,000 evacuated residents in Fukushima are still living in 
temporary housing and are still uncertain as to when and whether they can return 
to their original hometowns. Although conditions at the Fukushima power stations 
have improved, it will take more than at least 40 years to decommission the plant, 
but the removal of melted debris is the most challenging task with high risk. It is 
still not clear whether the debris can be removed safely and how to dispose all radio-
active wastes from the decommissioning.
The task of decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi reactors is obviously the 
most challenging task that the global nuclear industry has faced. The Tokyo Electric 
Power Co (TEPCO) is still responsible for managing this important and challeng-
ing task, but the government has helped TEPCO by setting up the Inter-Ministerial 
Council for Contaminated Water and Decommissioning Issues which publish 
the “Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap towards the Decommissioning of TEPCO’s 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station”. The most recent one, published on 
September 26, 2017, again delayed the first phase (removing the spent fuel from 
storage pools of units 1–3) for more than 3 years [14].
There have been concerns about lack of transparency and independent oversight 
on the whole decommissioning process. The Japan Atomic Energy Commission, 
which is an advisory organ under the cabinet office, recommended that the govern-
ment should establish an independent (third party) organization with overseas 
experts as members to assess and audit the entire measures in order to maximize 
transparency [15]. But such independent organization has not been established by 
the government.
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After Prime Minister made a speech at the 125th Session of the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) on September 7, 2013 [16], in which he stressed that the 
situation in Fukushima is “under control,” the government announced that it would 
take more responsibility in contaminated water problems. The government set up 
“Inter-Ministerial Council for Contaminated Water and Decommissioning Issues,” 
and “frozen wall method” was chosen by the Council as the best technology to deal 
with the contaminated water. However, it was not clear why this technology was 
chosen. Many underground water experts raise doubts about the effectiveness of 
the technology which is often used for a small-scale underground water treatment 
but has never been used for such a large-scale operation. Experts suggested that 
there are simpler and cheaper alternative technologies available, but selection was 
made in a closed meeting without full disclosure of its selection process [17]. The 
frozen wall was completed, but NRA gave a license to start operation of the wall on 
August 15, 2017, but its effectiveness is still unclear.
The second example of lack of transparency is the estimate of total cost of 
decommissioning. On December 20, 2016, the Committee for Reforming TEPCO 
and Overcoming 1F Challenges under the METI published new cost estimate for 
decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi and compensation and decontamination 
of land. The total cost jumped from previous estimate of 11 trillion yen to 22 trillion 
yen [18]. But the foundations of such estimate are very weak. The analysis done by 
an independent economic think tank, Japan Center for Economic Research (JCER), 
did its own cost estimate, and it would be between 50 and 70 trillion yen [19]. JCER 
suggested that METI’s estimates do not include final disposal cost of the waste com-
ing from the decommissioning and decontamination which METI admitted. But 
based on the TEPCO Committee’s estimate, METI made a decision that part of the 
total cost will be paid by other power producers and taxpayers.
According to the recent report published at the public hearing organized by the 
subcommittee on treatment of contaminated water on August 30, 2018, cumulative 
radioactivity in tank storage is now reaching to 1000 tera Becquerel (TBq), and the 
number of storage tank is now 860 units [20]. It is suggested by TEPCO that there 
will be no enough space to build additional storage tanks by 2020.
The subcommittee presented recommended that the water, which still contains 
tritium but no other radioactive materials which will be removed by the processing 
facilities (called “ALPS”), be released to the sea after confirming that the radioactive 
concentration is below the standard agreed beforehand, which is 1500 Bq/l. This 
standard is extremely low compared with drinking water standard of tritium water 
set by the World Health Organization (WHO) which is 10,000 Bq/l. But one of the 
conditions to release the tritium water is that all other radioactive substances are 
removed by the ALPS below detectable limit or regulatory standards. Unfortunately, 
it was reported that some radioactive materials such as strontium-90 (Sr-90) were not 
completely removed and its concentration was above the regulatory standards [21].
It would be fair to conclude that if there is an independent oversight organiza-
tion, all above cases could have been avoided, or at least the public trust might have 
been better by presenting objective assessment of the situation.
4.2 Spent fuel and radioactive waste management
Even before the Fukushima accident, what to do with accumulating spent fuel 
on-site at nuclear power plants was a major policy issue for nuclear utilities and 
the government. The basic policy for spent fuel management in Japan has been 
(and still is) “reprocessing and recycling plutonium” for energy use. As a result, in 
Japan, spent fuel is considered as “resource (asset)” and not as a “waste.” Under the 
Japanese Law on Final Disposal of Specified Radioactive Waste (which is the law 
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for geological disposal of radioactive waste), the “specified waste” is defined as the 
waste coming out of reprocessing plant, i.e., vitrified waste and TRU waste, but 
spent fuel is not included. Like many other countries, Japan has not found a final 
repository site for high-level radioactive waste (HLW).
In Japan, the Law on Final Disposal of Specified Radioactive Waste was passed in 
2000 which established Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NUMO) as the 
principal implementation institution for final disposal. But no single site has been found 
even for literature survey which is the first step of siting of disposal site. Since then, only 
one town (Toyo Town) volunteered to be a candidate for site survey but later canceled 
the request due to strong public opposition. In order to improve public acceptance, in 
2010, JAEC issued a request to the Science Council of Japan for their advice on how 
to improve public communication on HLW. This was the first time that JAEC issued a 
request to an independent third party to review its program. The Science Council of 
Japan (SCJ) recommended “fundamental reform” of Japan’s HLW waste disposal policy. 
In particular, one important recommendation was to secure an open discussion forum 
where “independent, autonomous scientific groups can exchange their opinions” [22].
The JAEC responded with its own policy statement on December 18, 2012 [23]. 
JAEC agreed with SCJ on above point and recommended that the government 
“establish an independent and functionally effective third party organization to 
provide suitable advice to the government and related parties in time.”
Responding to SCJ and JAEC’s recommendation, METI set up two working 
groups, one of which is to look at the siting process including public participa-
tion. That working group also recommended that the government should “set up 
a scheme to conduct independent from a third party’s point of view” [24]. Based 
on its findings, the Japanese government published its new basic policy for HLW 
Disposal in May 2015 which specifies that JAEC is the organization to review the 
METI’s program as an independent organization [25]. But JAEC is not truly an 
independent organization as it is responsible for promoting nuclear energy under 
the basic Atomic Energy Act.
The following incident proved that current scheme is still lacking such indepen-
dent review function. NUMO initiated public consultation process based on this 
map, but the NUMO again lost its public trust in this public consultation process. 
It was reported that NUMO’s contracted organization paid students and others to 
attend the public consultation meetings so that the meetings seemed successful in 
gathering general public [26].
Again, one fundamental issue is public trust. The Science Council of Japan 
recently published a report to follow up its own report published in 2013. In the 
new report, they re-emphasized the importance of a “consensus building process” 
for HLW disposal and proposed the creation of “national people’s conference on 
radioactive waste” [27].
4.3 Plutonium stockpile management
As noted above, Japan’s basic policy is to reprocess all spent fuel and recover 
plutonium and uranium to recycle them for energy use. However, in reality, the 
plutonium usage program (recycling as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel into existing 
reactors and fast breeder reactors in the future) has been delayed significantly. As a 
result, as of the end of 2017, Japan possessed about 47.3 tons of separated plutonium 
(10.5 tons in Japan and 36.7 tons in France and the United Kingdom where Japan 
had commercial reprocessing contracts) (Table 1) [28]. This is the largest stockpile 
among nonnuclear weapon states and could increase further if the Rokkasho repro-
cessing plant starts operation in 2021 and its recycling program into 16–18 reactors 
as currently planned does not smoothly move ahead [29].
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This plutonium stockpile issue has raised international concern. In 2016, a for-
mer US government official expressed his concern over Japan’s plutonium stockpile 
and its reprocessing policy. Jon Wolfsthal, Senior Director for Arms Control and 
Nonproliferation at the National Security Council said the following in a recent 
interview with Kyodo Press:
“There is no question that plutonium recycling in Japan has been expensive. That 
is a challenging future for Japan. If Japan were to change course, they would find 
the United States to be supportive…. The upcoming renewal in 2018 of a bilateral 
nuclear agreement with Japan has the potential to become a very controversial 
issue…If Japan keeps recycling plutonium, what is to stop other countries from 
thinking the exact same thing?” [30].
As noted above, under the 1988 US-Japan bilateral nuclear energy cooperation 
agreement, Japan has been given a 30-year “programmatic prior consent” on repro-
cessing, i.e., unlike a typical bilateral agreement, Japan does not need a case-by-case 
prior consent on reprocessing. This has been considered as a “special privilege” as 
only the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and Japan are given 
such special arrangements. The 1988 agreement was extended without any amend-
ment in July 2018, but now the agreement could be canceled if either party notifies 
the other party 6 months in advance.
Concern over reprocessing programs are also spreading in Northeast Asia. The 
ROK government, during bilateral negotiation with the USA, strongly insisted that 
it has a sovereign right to reprocessing as Japan does. China is now planning to build 
a commercial reprocessing plant, imported from France, while criticizing Japan for 
holding a large plutonium stockpile. So, it has become a regional security issue and 
needs to be addressed with serious attention [31].
In order to reduce such international concern, the METI’s new Energy Strategic 
Plan [5] mentions for the first time that Japan aims to “reduce its plutonium stock-
pile”. In addition, on July 31, 2018, JAEC also published its new “Basic Principles on 
Japan’s Utilization of Plutonium,” which says the following:
2016 (kg) 2017 (kg)
Stock in Japan (Pu total)
Reprocessing plants 3913 3863
MOX fuel plant 3805 3854
Stored at reactors 2126 2829
Subtotal (Pu fissile)* 9844 (6605) 10,548 (7050)
Stocks in Europe (Pu total)
The United Kingdom 20,839 21,232
France 16,217 15,486
Subtotal: Pu total (Pu fissile) 37,058 (24,510) 36,718 (24,265)
Total (Pu fissile) 46,902 (31,115) 47,266 (31,315)
*Fissile plutonium (Pu 239 and Pu 241) contents of plutonium which is typically about 60% of total plutonium 
which includes non-fissile isotope of plutonium (Pu 240 and Pu 242).
Source: [23].
Table 1. 
Japan’s plutonium stockpile (as of the end of 2016 and 2017).
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Japan will reduce the size of plutonium stockpile. Based upon realization of the 
following measures, the stockpile is not to increase from the current level. [32].
Although such new policy can be a positive step, that may not be enough. In 
2017, strong policy recommendations were made by experts from the USA and Japan 
who participated in an International Conference on Plutonium Policy (PuPo 2017). 
They recommend to establish a “Joint Commission” between the US and Japanese 
governments to review the issue of nuclear fuel cycle policy and to analyze ways 
to deal with plutonium stockpile owned by both the Japanese and US governments 
[33]. In fact, experts from both inside and outside of Japan recently recommended 
to revise Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle policy and to find specific ways to reduce pluto-
nium stockpile [34, 35].
While all recommendations would be helpful, the recommendation by the 
International Conference (PuPo 2017) is particularly interesting. The participants 
acknowledge the importance of “independent oversight” and recommend to estab-
lish “US-Japan bilateral joint commission” which can play such role.
5.  Results and discussion: lack of independent oversight is the common 
problem
As can be seen from the above three cases, Japan’s policy debate is now polarized 
between “pro” and “anti” which led to unconstructive policy debate over important 
policy issues which need to be resolved regardless of the future of nuclear power. It 
is the lack of independent oversight that needs to be addressed.
In the first case of decommissioning process of the Fukushima Daiichi reactor, 
lack of independent oversight resulted in wrong choice of technology dealing with 
contaminated water and inappropriate treatment of contaminated water. In the 
second case of disposal of radioactive waste, despite recommendations within the 
government, the METI has not established an independent oversight organization. 
Instead it still relies on JAEC which is not truly an independent organization. This led 
to lack of public trust and misconduct by NUMO. The third case dealing with pluto-
nium stockpile also shows that independent oversight organization is recommended 
to solve complex technical/social and even international security issues involved.
In fact, right after the Fukushima accident, JAEC emphasized in its policy state-
ments that having an independent oversight by the third party is essential to restore 
public trust and more constructive policy debate. The proposal to establish such an 
independent oversight organization was made in the context of (1) decommission-
ing process of the Fukushima Daiichi reactors, (2) decision-making process of final 
disposal of radioactive waste, and (3) assessment of nuclear fuel cycle and R&D 
programs. In all these cases, the assessment has been done only by the government 
agencies or the advisory council under the responsible government agencies.
What constitutes the key characteristics of “independent, third” party for 
the oversight process? The author argues that the following four conditions are 
essential:
First, independent funding and secretariat; it is essential that the organization 
must have independent funding and its own secretariat. In fact, JAEC was criticized 
in 2012 that its secretariat staff came from power companies and nuclear industry. 
Later, JAEC released those staff to be more independent. Still their staff come from 
other government agencies and it has no own staff.
Second, independent expertise; unless the organization has its own independent 
expertise, it has to rely on the outside organizations. Their analysis and judgment 
may not be independent if it does not have enough expertise in the organization.
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Third, legal authority; independency must be institutionalized by legal status, 
and clear statute is needed. Ambiguous status of the organization can lose its influ-
ence and effectiveness.
Finally, complete transparency in its decision-making process. It is essential that 
transparency must be institutionalized backed by legal standard so that it can be 
verified later.
The establishment of independent oversight organization is also recom-
mended by the National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent 
Investigation Commission in 2012. In its recommendation 7, it says the following:
“A system for appointing independent investigation committees, including experts 
largely from the private sector, must be developed to deal with unresolved issues, 
including, but not limited to, the decommissioning process of reactors, dealing with 
spent fuel issues, limiting accident effects and decontamination” [36].
In May 2017, the Diet finally established an advisory board, consisting of eight 
independent experts but has not established the independent investigating com-
mittees recommended above even 7 years after the accident. If the government 
cannot establish such independent oversight organization, the Diet can set up such 
independent organization to overcome Japan’s polarized policy debate over nuclear 
power.
6. Conclusions
The Fukushima nuclear accident has not been over yet. The impacts of the 
Fukushima accident continue and have changed the nature of energy policy debate 
dramatically. The accident also triggered the changes of energy supply/demand 
structure significantly. The following are the main conclusions of this study:
1. Despite large reduction of nuclear energy production, Japan has managed to 
keep supply/demand in balance and reduced both electricity rate and carbon 
emissions primarily due to reduction in power consumption through improved 
energy efficiency.
2. Such trends are likely to continue if fossil fuel prices continue to rise and Japan 
could reduce its carbon emission more than 60% by 2050, with or without 
nuclear power.
3. The loss of public trust is one of the most important impacts of the Fukushima 
accident, and the majority of the public is now in favor of phasing out of 
nuclear power eventually. Still the Japanese government maintains that nuclear 
power is an important energy source and has not changed basic nuclear energy 
policy. As a result, nuclear policy debate in Japan has been polarized.
4. Based on three important policy case studies, it is found that lack of independ-
ent oversight can be a common cause for blocking the constructive debate 
leading to ways to solve important policy issues.
5. Establishment of such independent oversight organization has been recom-
mended by both within and outside of the government, but it has not been 
realized. In order to overcome polarized policy debate, either the government 
or the Diet needs to establish such independent oversight organization.
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